

Message Text

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USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W

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P R 061432Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2361

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 3097

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING
OF APRIL 2, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN THE AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF
APRIL 2, DISCUSSION FOCUSED UPON THE REPORT OF THE
APRIL 1 INFORMAL SESSION WITH THE EAST (VIENNA 2913
AND 2914). THE GROUP WAS DIVIDED OVER WHETHER THE
SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS FIRST WHOSE FORCES TO
REDUCE AT THE OUTSET REPRESENTED A SIGN OF REAL
FLEXIBILITY OR SIMPLY A DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE THE WEST
WITHOUT MAKING CONCESSIONS. MAJORITY LEANED TOWARDS
FIRST VIEW, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF US REP'S COMMENT

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THAT KHLESTOV'S LONG SUMMING-UP HAD BEEN READ FROM A

PREPARED TEXT AND THAT THE HINTS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET FLEXIBILITY GIVEN BY KHLESTOV WERE NOT SIMPLY A BY-PRODUCT OF THE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF DISCUSSION. THE GROUP WAS INTERESTED BY, BUT UNCERTAIN OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF, SOVIETS HINTS THAT (A) WEST EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IN LIEU OF ACTUAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET, (B) SOVIET COMPLAINT THAT EAST HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY TO QUERIES OF POSSIBLE WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCE FREEZE, (C) INTEREST IN COMMON CEILING IMPLIED BY QUESTIONING ON HOW FRENCH FORCES COULD BE INCLUDED IF FRANCE WAS NOT A PARTICIPANT, AND (D) SOVIET STRESS ON DEFINING GROUND FORCES PRIOR TO THE COMING RECESS. GROUP FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET A CRYPTIC REMARK BY KHLESTOV ON POSSIBLE UNILATERAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2. GROUP DISCUSSED PROS AND CONS OF AN ADDITIONAL INFORMAL SESSION ON APRIL 8 TO DISCUSS DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. A FINAL DECISION WAS POSTPONED UNTIL PROPOSED WESTERN TALKING POINTS COULD BE EXAMINED, BUT MAJORITY FELT SESSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE.

3. GROUP ALSO APPROVED CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT FOR MARCH 25-31 AND AGREED TO ANOUNCE APRIL 10 PRESS BRIEFINGS ON APRIL 5. END SUMMARY.

4. DISCUSSION OF CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLYREPORT FOR 25231 MARCH. CHAIRMAN (BELGIAN REP ADRIANENSSSEN) SOLICITED GROUP COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT (TEST SEPTEL). US REP CIRCULATED ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH TO COVER PLENARY OF 28 MARCH. FRG REP (BEHREND) FELT THAT ONE PASSAGE OVERSTATED SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON US/SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE. CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) SUGGESTED THAT PARAGRAPH CONCERNING WHICH FORCES WERE TO BE REDUCED FIRST BE STRENGTHENED IN ORDER FURTHER TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALLIED TALKING POINTS USED WITH THE EAST HAD INSISTED ON PRIORITY OF DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. GROUP AGREED. TEXT WAS APPROVED AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION OF MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES.

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5. DISCUSSION OF 1 APRIL INFORMAL SESSION WITH THE EAST (VIENNA 2913 AND 2914). BELGIAN REP SAID THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION, AS ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS, THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS PLEASANT BUT THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD EXPECTED THE OTHER TO PRESENT ANY NEW IDEAS, AND IN FACT NONE WERE PRESENTED. HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SESSION AS A STANDOFF.

6. FRG REP NOTED THAT AS IN LAST INFORMAL SESSION, SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV) DID VIETUALLY ALL THE TALKING FOR THE EAST. CZECHOSLOVAK REP AND GDR REPS HAD SAID NEXT TO NOTHING. FRG REP WAS STRUCK BY FACT THAT SOVIET REP ON THIS OCCASION HAD NOT PUSHED FOR HIS SYMBOLIC REDUC-TION PROPOSAL. SOVIET REP HAD ATTACHED GREAT URGENCY TO SETTLING THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES BEFORE THE EASTER RECESS. SOVIET REP HAD SAID THAT FORCE STRENGTH DATA MIGHT BE DISCUSSED LATER, HIS POSITION ON THIS SEEMED SOMEWHAT MORE FORTHCOMING THAN HERETOFORE. SOVIET REP HAD ASKED MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY AND HOW THE AGREEMENT COULD BE OBSERVED WITHOUT A FRENCH COMMITMENT. HE HAD NOT, HOWEVER, CONTESTED FRG REP'S REPLY THAT THIS WAS AN INTERNAL ALLIED PROBLEM WHICH NATO WOULD RESOVE AND THAT IT WOULD BE COVERED IN ANY CASE BY NATO'S COMMITMENT TO A COMMON CEILING REGARDLESS OF CHANGES IN FRENCH FORCE LEVELS. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIET REP HAD INDICATED SOME FLEXIBILITY ON WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. SOVIET REP, AFTER SAYING THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, HAD THEN SAID IT WAS UP TO ALLIES TO PROPOSE VARIANTS OF THE FORMS OF SUCH REDUCTION AND BOTH SIDES COULD CONSIDER HOW ALL ELEVEN PARTICIPANTS WOULD "INDICATE THEIR READINESS TO PROCEED TO REDUCTING. " FRG REP SAW THIS AS A HINT THAT A COMMITMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN PLACE OF ACTUAL REDUCTION FROM THE OUTSET.

7. FRG REP URGED CAUTION IN INTERPRETING A POSSIBLE SOVIET HINT OF A POSSIBILITY OF EQUAL US-SOVIET REDUC-TIONS IN A FIRST PHASE IF THERE WERE A FREEZE OF FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS (PARA 49 OF VIENNA 2914). SOVIET REP HAD ACTUALLY ONLY COMPLAINED THAT ALLIES HAD
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NOT SAID ANYTHIN YET ABOUT THE POSSIBLITY OF A FREEZE ON NON-US SOVIET FORCES IN THE EVENT OF FIRST PHASE REDUCTION LIMITED TO US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES. ONE COULD INTERPRET THIS AS AN INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY, SAID FRG REP, BUT IT WAS NOT QUITE CLEAR.

8. FRG REP NOTED THAT EAST REPS HAD BEEN QUITE SUSPICIOUS AT FIRST OF ALLIED FORMULATION OF FOCUSING ON WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST, BUT AFTER A CAUCUS, HAD ACCEPTED THIS GENERAL FORMULATION BY THE END OF THE SESSION. SOVIET REP HAD IN THE END SUMMARIZED EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO PHASED APPROACH AND CONTENT OF REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY ALLIES, BUT HAD ACCEPTED REMINDER BY US REP THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS NOT GERMANE TO TOPIC OF WHICH FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. THIS OUTCOME SHOWED BENEFIT OF

FORMULATION PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES.

9. US REP ADDED THAT AT THE END OF THE SESSION SOVIET REP WAS USING TYPEWRITTEN NOTES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ANY OF THE INFORMAL SESSIONS. US REP SAID THIS APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT KHLESTOV BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS TO BE THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION AND HAD THEREFORE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO PREPARATION OF PRECISE STATEMENT OF AREAS OF EASTERN FLEXIBILITY. SOVIET REP'S OVERALL HARD LINE HAD BEEN INTERLarded WITH ITEMS FOR THE ALLIES TO THINK ABOUT DURING THE EASTER RECESS. THESE ITEMS

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P R 061432Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2362

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

HAD NOT BEEN PROVOKED BY THE ACTUAL COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION,
BUT HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN PREPARED IN ADVANCE.

10. UK ACTING REP (GOODALL) ASKED IF SOVIET REP'S SUMMARY WAS INDEED A PREPARED STATEMENT. US DEP REP REPLIED THAT SOVIET REP HAD SPOKEN FROM BOTH TYPEWRITTEN AND HANDWRITTEN PREPARED NOTES. SOVIET REP HAD FURTHERMORE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THREE POINTS WHICH AHG HAD ALREADY INCLUDED IN ITS REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE IN REPORT TO NAC. THIS SHOWED THAT THE EAST TOOK THESE POINTS SERIOUSLY.

11. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) DISAGREED WITH CHAIRMAN'S DESCRIPTION OF SESSION AS A STANDOFF. THE SOVIET REP HAD SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO MOVE, ALTHOUGH THE CONTOURS WERE NOT YET
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CLEAR. GROUP SHOULD WORK THIS FINDING INTO ITS ASSESSMENT IN REPORT TO NAC. THE FACT THAT SOVIET REP AFTER DISCUSSION WITH HIS COLLEAGUES HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS FIRST WHICH FORCES TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, EVEN WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING WOULD REMAIN INFORMAL AND WOULD NOT BE MENTIONED IN PLENARY, WAS AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION TO THE ALLIES. NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT SOVIET REPS COMPLAINT THAT EAST HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY ON POSSIBLE WEST EUROPEAN FORCE FREEZE INDICATED THAT SOVIET REP HAD ACCEPTED IN HIS OWN MIND THAT THE FIRST PHASE WILL BE RESTRICTED TO US-SOVIET FORCES. NETHERLANDS REP REFERRED TO CRYPTIC REMARK BY SOVIET REP "I DON'T KNOW WHAT MOSCOW WOULD SAY IF I PROPOSED UNILATERAL STATEMENTS ON REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR SOME OTHER FORMS." WHEN SOVIET REP SAID THAT, WAS HE READING FROM PREPARED NOTES? US DEP REP REPLIED THAT SOVIET REP WAS READING FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTES AT THAT POINT. NETHERLANDS REP OBSERVED THAT THIS CONCEPT COULD PROVIDE FOR UNILATERAL STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS OF THEIR INTENTION TO FREEZE NUCLEAR FORCES.

12. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT SOVIET REP'S QUESTIONS ABOUT MECHANISM TO ENSURE INCLUSION OF FRENCH FORCES IN COMMON CEILING SHOWED THAT THE EAST WAS GIVING AT LEAST SOME STUDY TO THE CONCEPT OF COMMON CEILING.

13. BELGIAN REP EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IN MAKING THESE POINTS THE RUSSIANS SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN KEEPING ALLIED INTEREST ALIVE THAN IN MAKING REAL POINTS. THEY MERELY WANT TO KEEP THE POT BOILING. THIS MIGHT BE A SUBJECTIVE VIEW, HE ADMITTED, BUT THIS WAS HIS IMPRESSION. US DEP REP POINTED OUT THAT SOVIETS HAD DROPPED THEIR PRESSURE FOR SYMBOLIC REDUCTION AND HAD ADDED HINTS ON ALLIED PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS FAIRLY CLEAR DEPARTURE FROM THEIR STANCE AS RECENTLY AS PREVIOUS INFORMAL.

14. ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI) AGREED WITH CHAIRMAN THAT SOVIET REP WAS TRYING TO KEEP A DIALOGUE GOING BY HINTING AT FLEXIBILITY. SOVIET REP HAD POSSIBILITY OF FREEZE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND. NATO SHOULD STUDY ACCEPTABILITY OF FREEZE CONCEPT AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE SINCE ALLIES WILL SOON BE CONFRONTED WITH THIS QUESTION IN SPECIFIC FORM. ITALIAN REP NOTED THAT SOVIET REP AT ONE TIME IN SESSION REFERRED TO US-SOVIET FORCES AS "FOREIGN FORCES" AND ELSEWHERE INCLUDED BRITISH, CANADIAN, NETHERLANDS, AND BELGIAN

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TROOPS UNDER THIS RUBRIC. AT NEXT INFORMAL SESSION ALLIED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD POINT OUT SOVIET REP'S CONFUSION TO HIM.

15. FRG REP SUGGESTED REVISED WORDING OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION TO MAKE CLEARER FACT THAT ALLIES HAD STRESSED POINT TO EASTERN SIDE THAT FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN FIGURES FOR NATO FORCES GOVEN TO THE EAST. UK ACTING REP OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS DOUBLY IMPORTANT SINCE SOVIET REP WAS SEEING FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON 2 APRIL AND SUBJECT WOULD INEVITABLY COME UP. US REP CORRECTED THAT FRENCH-SOVIET MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE ON 1 APRIL.

16. GREEK REP (DOUNTAS) RAISED QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF CRYPTIC REMARK BY SOVIET REP (QUOTED IN PARA 11 ABOVE) ON UNILATERAL NUCLEAR STATEMENTS. USUALLY SOVIET REP WAS NOT SHY ABOUT REFERRING TO PHASING. COULD THE SOVIET REP HAVE BEEN HINTING AT UNILATERAL NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AGREED BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF MBFR? THE WORD "UNILATERAL" IN SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT APPEARED SIGNIFICANT. US DEP REP REPLIED THAT IF SOVIET REP STILL HAD SYMBOLIC REDUCTION IN MIND DESPITE HIS FAILURE TO PUSH THE IDEA DURING PRESENT SESSION, HE MAY HAVE MEANT THAT EAST WOULD CONSIDER ACCEPTING UNILATERAL STATEMENTS OF INTENTION BY US AND USSR TO REDUCE NUCLEAR FORCES AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF LIMITED GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I. NETHERLANDS REP ADDED THAT SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT DOES FIT INTO THE CONTEXT OF MBFR SINCE SUCH A COMMITMENT BY THE US WOULD GREATLY SIMPLIFY THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS FOR THE SOVIETS. ITALIAN REP SAID SOVIET REP'S REMARK MIGHT BE A HINT AT AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION, BUT WHAT "OTHER FORMS" DID HE MEAN?

17. BELGIAN REP OBSERVED THAT POLISH REP (STRULAK) HAD DONE MOST OF THE TALKING ABOUT NUCLEARS IN THE PAST -- AND IN A HEAVILY PROPAGANDISTIC TONE. IF SOVIET REP WAS HINTING AT A UNILATERAL AGREEMENT IT MIGHT MEAN THAT THE EAST WAS WILLING TO EXCLUDE NUCLEARS FOR THE MOMENT, BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE MEANT WITHIN MBFR OR OUTSIDE. AT THE SAME TIME THAT HE WAS TRYING TO INDICATE TO THE WEST LESS SOVIET CONCERN ON NUCLEARS, HE MAY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PLACATE EASTERN EUROPEAN FEARS OF WESTERN NUCLEARS.

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18. NETHERLANDS REP WARNED THAT A SOVIET APPEAL FOR A UNILATERAL
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE US AND

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ACTION ACDA-19

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P R 061432Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE APPEAL TO WESTERN PUBLIC
OPINION. THE REMARK MAY THEREFORE HAVE BEEN A HINT OF A THREAT
TO BRING THE ISSUE OUT IN THE OPEN. CHAIRMAN ADDED THAT LAST
STATEMENT IN PLENARY ON 28 APRIL BY GDR REP CONTAINED NEW
ARGUMENTS ON NUCLEARS WHICH APPEARED AIMED AT PSYCHOLOGICAL
IMPACT.

19. DISCUSSION OF PLANNED APRIL 8 INFORMAL WITH EAST. REFERRING

TO THE SUGGESTION MADE IN THE APRIL 1 INFORMAL THAT THERE BE ANOTHER INFORMAL SESSION ON APRIL 8 TO DISCUSS THE DEFINITION OF "GROUND FORCES," NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TIME TO OBTAIN GUIDANCE FROM THE NAC AND FROM CAPITALS ON HOW TO DISCUSS DATA CATEGORIES. US-SOVIET DATA WOULD COME UP FIRST, AND WOULD POSE NO REAL PROBLEM, BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT

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TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON OTHER FORCES IN IME. ITALIAN REP ECHOED THIS QUESTION, AND ALSO WONDERED WHETHER THE SAME PARTICIPANTS FROM THE ALLIED SIDE WOULD ATTEND, AND WHETHER THEY WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY MILITARY EXPERTS.

20. US REP REPLIED IN TERMS OF PROPOSAL ACTUALLY MADE, THAT ALLIES COULD CONCENTRATE ONLY ON CONCEPTS OF WHAT TO INCLUDE AND WHAT NOT TO INCLUDE IN CATEGORIES; THEREFORE NO DATA WOULD BE NEEDED FROM NATO. IN THIS WAY ALLIES COULD SMOKE OUT EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO ALLIED CONCEPTS, AND HOPE TO GET MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CATEGORIES THE EAST USES WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE DURING RECESS, WITHOUT HAVING TO RESPOND TO EAST NOW AT MEETING AS REGARDS ANYTHING EAST MIGHT CHALLENGE OR QUESTION. ALLIES SHOULD SIMPLY FOCUS ON DEFINITION OF GROUPND FORCES. THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR DATA AT THIS TIME. SOVIET REP HAD LAUGHED WHEN ALLIED REPS HAD SUGGESTED DISCUSSING SUBJECT AFTER RECESS AND HAD SAID DATA WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY AT THE THE START. SOVIET DISE WILL TRY TO DISCUSS AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES BUT ALLIES WILL REFUSE. THERE ARE EXCLUSIONS FROM CATEGORY OF GROUND FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, AND COURSE OF DISCUSSION WILL SHOW THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS CANNOT BE TREATED WITHOUT NUMBERS. ALLIES WILL THEN BE ABLE TO BOLIGE EAST TO DISCUSS DATA. US DEP REP ADDED THAT ALLIES COULD USE DISCUSSION MERELY TO COMPILE A TABLE OF CONTENTIOUS ELEMENTS AND LATER CONSIDER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH REGARD TO EACH.

21. NETHERNLANDS REP SAID THAT PORPOSED DISCUSSION SOUNDED SUPERFICIAL. CHAIRMAN REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE THAT JUDGEMENT UNTIL GROUP HAD OPPORTUNITY TO SEE DRAFT TALKING POINTS. UK ACTING REP WARNDDED THAT ALLIES WOULD IN SUCH DISCUSSION BE FORCED TO DISCUSS DATA WHICH THEY HAD HERETOFORE RESERVED FOR DISCUSSION IN PHASE TWO. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, ALL ALLIES COULD SAY AT THIS POINT WAS THAT THEY REGARDED EVERYONE IN AN ARMY UNIFORM AS BELONGING TO GROUND FORCES. THE TALKING POINTS THEREFORE WON'T VE VERY INFORMATIVE AND ALLIED PARTICIPANTS IN SESSION COULD DO NO MORE THAN LISTEN TO QUESTIONS WITHOUT DANGEROUSLY COMPROMISING THEIR POSITION. NETHERLANDS REP SUPPORTED UK ACTING REP. ALL ALLIES REPS WERE ENTITLED TO SAY ABOUT WEST EUROPEAN FORCES WAS THAT THEY WILL BE DEALT WITH IN PHASE TWO. BEFORE WORKING OUT CATEGORIES, AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED ON COMMON CEILING.

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22. ITALIAN REP FORESAW LITTLE DANGER THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD COMPROMISE PHASE TWO POSITION. ALLIES HAD PROPOSED REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES AND WERE THEREFORE OBLIGED TO DISCUSS WHAT CONSTITUTED GROUND FORCES. MOREOVER SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD PERMIT ALLIES FLEXIBILITY TO REVISE NATO STRENGTH FIGURES PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TO THE EAST. FRG REP AGREED WITH ITALIAN REP, SAYING THAT, SINCE ALLIES HAD GIVEN DATA ON NATO GROUND FORCES TO THE EAST, IT WAS QUITE LEGITIMATE FOR THE EAST TO ASK WHAT WENT INTO THAT FIGURE. THE ALLIES COULD LIMIT DISCUSSION TO CONTENTIOUS AREAS SUCH AS COMBAT HELICOPTERS AND PERSHING. HE FORESAW NO DANGERS IN DISCUSSION OF DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. UK ACTING REP DEMURRED, SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT IT DANGEROUS TO GIVE EAST DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION AND WONDERED IF GROUP HAD ENOUGH TO GO ON WITHOUT ASKING AUTHORITY FROM NATO.

23. US REP REPLIED THAT NUMBERS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THE 8 APRIL INFORMAL SESSION. US DELEGATION COULD DRAFT SOME TALKING POINTS IF THAT WOULD HELP THE UK DELEGATION DEAL WITH THE ISSUE. THE PROPOSED DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE FIRST CHANCE TO EXPLORE EASTERN VIEWS ON THE SIZE OF THE DISPARITY WHICH THE ALLIES ARE ASSERTING, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE ALLIES WILL FIND OUT HOW THE EAST VIEWS THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL, WHICH WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE NAC AND FUTURE ALLIED THINKING. ALLIES COULD GAIN USEFUL INFORMATION AT LITTLE COST.

24. BELGIAN REP THOUGHT A LIMITED DISCUSSION BY HEADS OF MBFR DELEGATIONS WITHOUT EXPERTS WOULD MEET THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN THE MEETING. ITALIAN REP WONDERED WHETHER ALLIED PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ASKED TO AGREE TO DEFINITIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST. US REP REPLIED THAT ALLIED PARTICIPANTS WOULD MERELY LIST CONTENTIOUS POINTS AND MAKE NO COMMITMENTS.

25. AT THIS POINT FURTHER DISCUSSION WAS PUT OVER UNTIL US DRAFT TALKING POINTS COULD BE PRESENTED.

26. NEXT MEETING OF AD HOC GROUP WILL BE ON APRIL 3.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: EAST WEST MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA03097
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
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From: VIENNA
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Image Path:
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Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF APRIL 2, 1974
TAGS: PARM, XG, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005